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Abstract 
 
Using the extended version of the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR technique, this paper attempts to 
empirically predict the growth enhancing effect of discretionary fiscal policy shocks in both short- 
and long-run in Turkey over the period 2006:Q12015:Q1. Unlike previous studies which have 
mainly focused on fiscal policy instruments taxes and government spending at the aggregate 
level, this paper considers these instruments at the component level, and then attempts to analyze 
comparatively the effect of changes in each component on growth. The findings of the paper 
show that growth enhancing effect of discretionary fiscal policy shocks varies according to its 
components. However, discretionary fiscal policy shocks at the component level indicate mixed 
results. In the short-run, only the shocks to government spending have a Keynesian effect. In all 
other cases, discretionary fiscal policy shocks seem to capture a weak Keynesian and/or non-
Keynesian effect in the case of Turkey.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Fiscal policy has recently been on the agenda of many countries. In the aftermath of the 
financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, fiscal policy ―a long neglected tool of 
macroeconomic policy― has received a renewed attention among academics to policy makers.  
 
On the implementation side, with a great hope and expectation of overcoming the recent 
downturn or, at least, mitigating its negative effects on their economies, a number of both 
industrialized and developing countries have put into practice consecutive large fiscal stimulus 
packages. The size of these programmes has been quite remarkable in countries, ranging 
from nearly 2% of GDP in Europe to about 6% in the US and 13% of GDP in China (Sola, 
2013). Soon after the crisis, fiscal policy in general and its effectiveness to overcome economic 
downturns in particular have become a major concern among academic economist and 
policymakers. However, the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating economic activity is a 
highly controversial issue among scholars for a long time. Much of the controversy is related to 
the effect of discretionary fiscal policy, rather than its automatic stabilizer component.
1
 With 
the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 and then turned into a global recession, the 
controversy over the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy has further intensified. How 
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 The effects of fiscal policy on economic activity emerge in general through two different ways: Automatic 
stabilizers, and discreationary fiscal policy. Automatic stabilizers constitute nondiscreationary part of fiscal policy. In 
other words, they are the components of fiscal policy that automatically mitigate swings in output level without any 
active intervensions of government to economy through taxes and/or public spending. Unlike the active intervensions 
of government to economy by changes in fiscal policy instruments, that is discreationary fiscal policy, automatic 
stabilizers are automatic complience of the fiscal system to changes in economic activity.  
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output responds to discretionary fiscal policy changes and how to measure its effect on 
economic activity have become at the heart of our understanding.     
 
Since automatic fiscal stabilizers are frequently limited in scope (IMF, 2008), the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy is typically evaluated through its discretionary component. It involves an active 
intervention by government to economy through discretionary fiscal changes ―tax hikes and/or 
government spending increases. More recent empirical discussions have given much attention to 
the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages which have been considered as a proxy for 
discretionary fiscal policy. Although the effectiveness of such packages still remains an open 
question (Riera-Crichton et al., 2014), it is usually linked with fiscal multiplier. In other words, 
the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages is commonly analyzed through fiscal multiplier 
―that is, how much a dollar spent and/or tax hike by government creates a change in GDP. Put it 
simply, fiscal multiplier is the ratio of a change in GDP to a discretionary change in fiscal 
instruments, i.e. increase in government spending and/or tax cuts, with respect to their respective 
baselines.    
 
The sign, size and sensitivity of fiscal multiplier are crucial for the measurement of 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy. Fiscal multiplier can take three different values; positive, 
negative or zero. If it is equal to one, for instance, it means that a dollar spent and/or tax cut by 
government leads to a dollar rise in GDP. If fiscal multiplier is greater than one, it refers to that an 
increase in government spending and/or a decrease in taxes results in a higher increase in GDP. In 
the similar vein, if fiscal multiplier takes a value between zero and one, then GDP increases, but 
by less than the fiscal stimulus package implemented, say, a dollar tax cut and/or a dollar public 
spending increase. More clearly, the desired thing with fiscal multiplier, when a discretionary 
fiscal policy is aimed at boosting economic activity, is to have a fiscal multiplier with a positive 
value as well as higher than one. Because, a fiscal multiplier with a positive value as well as 
higher than one implies that the expansionary fiscal policy stimulates GDP with a higher 
proportion or amount than itself.  
 
This paper attempts to empirically predict the growth enhancing effect of discretionary 
fiscal policy shocks
2
 in Turkey. Unlike many previous papers, this paper considers fiscal 
policy instruments at the component level rather than at the aggregate level in predicting the 
effects of fiscal policy on growth. The paper employs the extended version of SVAR technique 
―with eight-shock variables― of  Blanchard and Perotti (2002) ―hereafter abbreviated as the 
B-P SVAR― which is widely accepted as a relatively more appropriate model not only for the 
empirical studies related to fiscal policy due to the fact that fiscal policy does not accurately 
response to changes in economic activity because of lag problem, but also for identifying the 
effects of discretionary fiscal policy shocks.     
 
The followings may be also added for the motivation why we have studied on such a topic:  
First and foremost, fiscal policy is not only a dynamic topic, but also its effectiveness is 
highly a disputable issue. Therefore, it is always possible to study on it; secondly, current fiscal 
policy related issues of the Turkish economy, such as relatively high size of government in the 
economy, sharp swings in GDP growth rates, high government debt make this policy important 
for Turkey and motivate us to study on it. Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, there have been 
few existing studies that attempt to predict the growth enhancing effect of discretionary fiscal 
policy shocks considering its sub-components specifically in the context of developing 
countries in general with the B-P SVAR, whereas there exist few studies in the case of 
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 What we mean by fiscal policy shocks are surprise [unexpected] changes induced by the government interventions in 
fiscal policy that is, an increase or decrease in taxes or government spending or both. 
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Turkey in particular; Fourthly, only few studies have been in the current literature analyzing the 
effects of fiscal policy instruments on main macroeconomic variables at sub-component basis 
on these countries. And finally, one more novelty of this paper is to extend the limited literature 
through a case study on a developing country like Turkey.     
     
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a short brief note on the 
Turkish economy with a special emphasize on fiscal policy. Section 3 provides a theoretical 
background to the paper, while Section 4 reviews at greater length the related empirical 
literature. Section 5 then introduces econometric specification, the B-P SVAR technique and 
data, respectively. Section 6 reports as well as discusses the empirical findings of the paper. 
And finally, Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Bird’s Eye View of Turkish Economy with a Special Emphasize on Fiscal Policy 
By any international standards, Turkey is a middle-size country. In an economic sense, it is 
regarded and then classified by the IMF as an emerging market economy like Brazil, Mexico, 
India, and China. Her current GDP per capita is well over US$10.000. According to the 
Medium-Term Economic Program prepared by the Ministry of Development, it is expected to go 
over US$ 11.000 in coming few years.  
 
Despite all these positive developments and a great progress, Turkey has faced several economic 
and political turbulences as well as instabilities in her past decades. No need to go far away, just 
looking at the period 1990-2000, it could be seen that the political situation was highly volatile, 
making the country one of the most instable economies, and a country which is filled with 
uncertainty among other emerging market economies. Instable and uncertain circumstances of 
recent decades have adversely hit the economy, thereby resulting in destabilizing exchange 
rates, increasing budget deficits and interest rates, accumulating high government debt stock, 
pushing upward pressure on inflation, increasingly worsening current account deficits, and 
finally shrinking economic growth. These undesirable political and economic developments 
forced Turkish authorities to knock the door of IMF, and Turkey has become an unchanging 
frequenter of the IMF loans. Turkey has signed four stand-by agreements [1994, 1999, 2002, 
and 2005] with the IMF since 1990 as part of its stabilization programs as well as re-structuring 
the economy. In other words, the vast majority of these programs were put into practice under 
the austerity of the IMF.  
 
Turkey faced with one of the most severe economic crisis in her history in April 1994. Just 
before the crisis, public sector borrowing requirement exceeded well over 10% of GDP, whereas 
annual CPI inflation on average peaked to almost 150%. In short, the main economic indicators 
worsened substantially. The main reason behind these miserable economic conditions was poor 
and inaccurate macroeconomic policy management, especially in the area of fiscal policy 
designing and management. Under these unfavorable economic conditions, the government put 
into practice a challenging stabilization program, what is called “April 5, 1994 Stabilization 
Measures”. Once again, fiscal policy was on the agenda of the Turkish authorities. The 
sustainability of public debt and, hence, fiscal policy became a primary concern not only for the 
authorities, but also for the leading international financial organizations, such as the IMF and 
World Bank. Consequently, Turkey had to sign its 16. Stand-by agreement with the IMF. Under 
this agreement and with the request of the IMF, Turkey implemented primary budget surplus 
criteria, targeting a surplus of 6.5% of GDP. However, the agreement lasted only for 14 months 
and ended up with a failure and then cancelling the agreement due to its poor economic 
performance. To reach this target became a prime concern of fiscal policy until the 2000s.       
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Following a new stand-by agreement with the IMF, a three-year exchange rate-based stabilization 
program was put into practice just before the beginning of 2000 to bring the Turkish economy 
into a sustainable path by overcoming chronic structural problems as well as gradually 
diminishing high and volatile inflation. In particular, two things ―establishing an independent 
supervisory and regulatory banking authority to improve the quality of financial stability and 
prompting privatization implementations were put on the high agenda of the government. The 
program initially showed a good progress and went on its way for the first 11 months. Since 
then, however, the situation reversed dramatically and collapsed in November 2000 with the 
early signs of financial markets’ stress, seeing the program unsustainable due to poor 
performance in maintaining the program. That crisis was followed by a more severe one, 
February 2001 Crisis. Soon after that, a new program based on the IMF’s stand-by with a new 
arranged target and hope was put into practice. If stated with general terms, Turkey showed 
relatively better performance in the 2000s. Inflation dropped to single digits, budget deficit -to- 
GDP ratio alongside public debt indicators almost catched up with the stipulations of the 
Maastricht Treaty as regard to fiscal convergence criteria. However, income inequality, 
unemployment, chronic and high current account deficit, and unstable and jobless growth have 
maintained their presence during the decade of the 2000s. At present, most of these problems 
still remain unsolved for the Turkish economy.  
 
Recent selected macroeconomic indicators of Turkey are presented in Table 1. What we see 
from the table at first glance, following the year 2013 with few exceptions, macroeconomic 
indicators of Turkey have considerably deteriorated relative to a couple of previous years. These 
negative developments could be possibly attributed to domestic problems and developments in 
international arena.  
 
Table 1: Recent Selected Macroeconomic Indicators of Turkey, 2010 - 2014 
 
Indicator Unit 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP Billion U$ 732 774 786 823 810 
GDP Growth Rate  % 9.2 8.8 2.2 4.1 2.8 
GDP Per Capita US$ 10.079 10.444 10.497 10.807 10.537 
CPI Inflation Year end,  % 6.4 10.4 6.2 7.40 8.17 
Unemployment Rate Average,  % 11.9 9.8 9.2 9.7 10.4 
Budget Deficit/ GDP  % -3.6 -1.3 -2.2 -1.2 -1.3 
Primary Balance/ GDP  % 0.8 1.9 1.4 2.0 1.5 
C. Government Debt Stock/ GDP  % 43.1 40.1 37.6 36.2 37.7 
[C. Government + Private External Debt Stock]/GDP  % 39.8 39.3 43.1 40.8 49.0 
Exchange Rate Year end, US$/TL 1.55 1.91 1.78 2.13 2.32 
Current Account Deficit/ GDP  % -6.2 -9.7 -6.0 -7.9 -5.7 
Gini Coefficient  % 40.2 40.4 40.2 n.a n.a 
Central Bank’s Reserves Billion US$ 86.0 88.7 125.4 124.2 126.4 
Source: The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Development, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Treasury, and Turkish Statistical Institute. 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
As mentioned earlier, the effects of fiscal policy shocks are a highly controversial issue which has 
created serious polarization between advocates and opponents. No matter how developed the 
country is, with the recent fiscal stimulus packages put into practice in a number of countries; 
such discussions have re-sparked off in academic and non-academic circles.  
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The focal point of discussions has been on the effectiveness of fiscal policy and thus whether its 
effect has been the Keynesian, non-Keynesian or weak Keynesian. Discretionary fiscal policy 
shocks may affect either demand-side or supply-side of an economy, or both. For instance, the 
Keynesian view claims that fiscal policy is effective on demand-side factors, whereas some 
others assert that it affects very much supply-side of the economy. This disagreement arises 
largely from the theoretical models and their assumptions in which fiscal policy measures put 
into practice [Briotti (2005), Arestis (2011)]. 
 
Keynes is the pioneering scholar of the idea of active involvement of government to the 
economy through fiscal policy. He argued that an expansionary fiscal policy affects aggregate 
demand and thus output level of the economy through fiscal policy multiplier under assumptions 
of price-wage rigidity, excess capacity and liquidity constrained economic agents. Put it more 
simply, the Keynesian view concentrates fully on demand-side of the economy and postulates 
that discretionary fiscal policy changes affect economic activity in the short-run.
3
 In other 
words, an expansionary fiscal policy causes multiplier effect on aggregate demand and thus on 
output ―that is greater than one and changes by depending on marginal propensity to consume. 
According to the Keynesian multiplier concept, the multiplier effect of a government spending 
increase is larger than that of a tax cut. If a government spending increase is solely financed 
through an increase in taxes, in this case the multiplier is called “balanced budget multiplier” 
which is equal to one. 
 
However, the Keynesian view has been challenged by new classical view with the argument of 
perverse effects of fiscal policy –so-called “non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy”4 [Hemming 
et al. (2002), Siwińska and Bujak (2003)]. New classical view emphasizes very much on supply-
side effects of fiscal policy neglected by the Keynesian view, rather than its demand-side effect. 
In particular, it points to the lack of microeconomic foundations of the Keynesian view.  
 
The 1990s witnessed a challenge to the Keynesian view with the seminal work of Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990). This work has been followed by many others, such as Alesina and Perotti 
(1997), and Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010). They all argued that contractionary fiscal policy 
could have a positive impact on economic activity. This argument was obviously contradicting 
the Keynesian view as well as traditional wisdom among macroeconomists. Since then, whether 
fiscal policy is Keynesian, weak Keynesian or non-Keynesian has become the one of the focal 
point of macroeconomic policy discussions.   
In contrast to the Keynesian view, the opposite view focuses to a large extent on supply-side 
effects of fiscal policy on the economy, rather than demand-side effects of it. Demand-side effect 
shows itself through expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy which changes positively or 
negatively the economic agents’ expectations with regard to their future disposable income and 
wealth. However, supply-side effects arise through labour market efficiency and subject to the 
competitiveness of the economy. In fact, arguments regarding the non-Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy arise from new classical view which greatly emphasizes supply-side factors 
[Hemming et al. (2002)], neglected by Keynes. Furthermore, the opposite view advocates non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy which are appraised in the context of Ricardian equivalence 
theorem, rational expectations, credibility, and positive growth effects of consolidation [See, i.e, 
Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010), Siwińska and Bujak (2003)].  
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 To be reminded here that the growth effect of discretionary fiscal policy changes is well illustrated by the standard 
IS-LM model.  
4
 We express here that it is also named commonly as “expansionary fiscal contraction”, and rarely as “anti-Keynesian” 
in the literature. 
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Fiscal multiplier is an important concept for fiscal policy. The effect of discretionary fiscal policy 
is typically measured and assessed in accordance with fiscal multiplier (Candelon and Leib, 
2013). As noted earlier, it measures the impact of a discretionary change in fiscal policy 
instruments, i.e. taxes and/or government spending, in terms of GDP response.  
In a nutshell, Table 2 summarizes the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity in accordance 
with the sign and size of the fiscal multiplier. The sign and size of the multiplier may vary 
considerably depending on a number of factors, such as the characteristics of the economy
5
, 
types of fiscal policy instruments used, global industry shocks, and country-specific regulations 
that may vary by industry [See, IMF (2008)].   
Table 2: Effects of Discretionary Fiscal Policy on Economic Activity by the Sign and Size of the Fiscal Multiplier  
Sign and Size of the 
Fiscal Multiplier [k] 
Effect of Fiscal Policy Basic Assumptions 
 
k  1  
 
Keynesian 
 Excess capacity 
 Price-wage rigidity 
 Consumption is related to current income  
 
1 > k > 0  
 
Weak Keynesian 
 
 Productive capacity of economy closes to full use 
 Market interest increases 
 Exchange rate appreciation 
 
 
0 > k or negative  
 
 
Non-Keynesian 
  Intertemporal optimization 
  Large fiscal imbalances 
  Risk premium on interest rates 
  Taxes are distortionary: Larger tax increases lead to larger distortionary 
effects. 
 Agents are forward-looking and not liquidity constrained  
 Agents are rational in forming their expectations  
 Credible fiscal consolidation 
 
 
 
k = 0  
 
 
 
Ricardian Equivalence 
 
  No matter how government deficit is financed, whether with debt or tax 
financing, the outcome would be the same and demand would remain 
unchanged. 
 Agents are fully aware of government’s intertemporal budget constraint 
 Agents are forward-looking  
 No liquidity constraints  
Source: Arranged by the Authors   
4. Review of the Related Empirical Literature 
With the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, fiscal policy and its role in stimulating 
economic activity have regained interest. Its role in mitigating business cycles, especially during 
downturn terms as in the case of the recent global recession, has been paid a great attention among 
large circles. In this context, the concentration has been given to the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus packages which have been put into practice as a response to the recession. Among many 
others, some leading studies are like Caldara and Kamps (2008), Feldstein (2009), Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009), Arestis (2011), Barro and Redlick (2011), Afonso and Sousa (2011, 2012), Alesina 
(2012), Coenen et al. (2012a), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Ilzetzki et al. (2013), and 
Caggiano et al. (2015) have recently analyzed this issue.  
Some of the studies above look  the issue at single country level [Cerda et al. (2006), Giordano 
et al. (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ahumada (2009), Spilimbergo et al. (2009), Ali and 
Ahmad (2010), Kuismanen and Kämppi (2010), Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2011), Ben-Sliamne 
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 They contain, inter alia, institutional factors related to fiscal policy, the degree of monetary policy accommodation, 
the extent of market rigidities, globalization and openness of the country to international trade, exhange rate regime, 
size of the government, and existance as well as degree of regulation on financial markets and accessing opportunities 
to global capital.  
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et al. (2011), and Yadav et al. (2012), Caggiano et al. (2015), among others], whereas some 
others look at the issue in the context of a specific group of countries, such as the OECD 
countries, the Euro Area, ASEAN countries, etc. For these types of studies, the followings may be 
listed to see at first glance: Arcangelis and Lamartina (2003), Kneller et al. (1999), Gemmell et 
al. (2011), Coenen et al. (2012a), Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2012), and Tang et al. (2013).  
 
In recent years, however, in particular at the onset of the recent crisis, studies analyzing the 
impact of fiscal policy shocks have focused greatly on the size, sign and sensitivity of fiscal 
multiplier to measure the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages [See, Romer and Romer, 
(2010), Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Auerbach et al. (2010), Gemmell (2011), Barro and 
Redlick (2011), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Ilzetzki et al. (2013), among many others].  
 
The study by Knell et al. (1999) investigated whether the impact of fiscal policy shocks on 
growth depends on the structure as well as the level of taxation and expenditure by using a 
panel data for 22 OECD countries
6
 over the period 1970-1995. They found that increasing 
productive expenditure
7
 or reducing distortionary taxes
8
 by 1% of GDP raises the growth rate 
by 0.1-0.2% per year. Based upon their findings, they concluded that i) distortionary taxes 
reduce growth, but not non-distortionary taxes; ii) productive government expenditure 
positively affects growth, but not non-productive expenditure. 
 
In their highly influential study, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) searched for the effects of fiscal 
policy shocks on GDP in the US by employing the B-P SVAR technique. Their paper displayed 
that fiscal policy does not have any positive effect on GDP in this country. On the contrary, they 
found a negative effect of fiscal policy shocks on GDP, what they called “non-Keynesian 
effect”. Perotti (2005) also examined the impact of fiscal policy by using the same approach but 
with a five-variable SVAR on GDP in five OECD countries the USA, the UK, Germany, 
Canada, and Australia. His findings are almost parallel to the findings of Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002), confirming the non-Keynesian effect of fiscal policy with the following two arguments: 
i) the effect of expansionary fiscal policy shocks on GDP is insignificant: Increases in 
government spending and reductions in taxes have smaller multipliers in the post-1980 period; 
ii) The effects of government spending and tax cuts on GDP and its components have 
substantially become weaker over time.    
 
Giordano et al. (2007) investigated the effects of fiscal policy shocks on GDP, inflation and the 
long-term interest rate in Italy by using a structural autoregression model for the period 
1982:Q1-2004:Q4 and then they concluded that a shock to government purchases of goods and 
services has a sizeable and robust effect on economic activity in Italy. In the similar vein, 
Kuismanen and Kämppi (2010) found that fiscal policy shocks significantly affect the economic 
activity in Finland, indicating that a positive tax shock seems to have a positive effect on GDP, 
whereas an increase in government spending crowds-out private sector activities, resulting in a 
reduction in GDP. On the other hand, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) investigated the effects of 
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 Consist of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UK, the USA, France, Belgium, Greece, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland. 
7
  As it is expressed in the study, government expenditures are differentiated according to whether they are included in 
the private production function or not. If they are, then they are classified as productive and hence have a direct effect 
upon the rate of growth. If they are not then they are classified as unproductive expenditures and do not affect the 
steady-state rate of growth. 
8
 Distortionary taxes refer to taxes which affect the investment decisions of agents with respect to physical and/or 
human capital, creating tax wedges and hence distorting the steady-state rate of growth. Non-distortionary taxation 
does not affect saving/ investment decisions due to the assumed nature of the preference function, and, hence, has 
no effect on the growth rate.  
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fiscal policy shocks by applying a VAR model to 1955-2000 US data. Based upon their 
empirical findings, they argued that deficit-financed tax cuts policy gives better results in 
relation to the others [deficit-spending, deficit-financed tax cuts, and a balanced budget spending 
expansion] to improve GDP, with a maximal present value multiplier of five dollars of total 
additional GDP per each dollar of the total cut in government revenue 5 years after the shock. 
Imposing the same model on the same country, Sola (2013) examined fiscal policy shocks from 
a different perspective, dividing them into two as temporary and permanent shocks. He found, 
among others, that temporary fiscal expansions positively affect output, while the latter 
negatively affect output, but with a lesser extent.  
 
On the other hand, some recent studies have focused on the sign, size and sensitivity of fiscal 
multiplier to measure the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages. In this regard, three influential 
studies may be referred to the studies of Barro and Redlick (2011), Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012), and Ilzetzki et al. (2013). For instance, the study of Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
searched for the macroeconomic effects of fiscal stimuli in 44 industrialized and developing 
countries by implementing panel SVAR techniques. They asserted that the impact of government 
expenditure shocks depends crucially on country-specific conditions, such as the level of 
development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, and public indebtedness. They concluded 
that, among the others,: i) the fiscal multipliers in open economies are smaller vis-á-vis closed 
economies; ii) the fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries are smaller or even negative; iii) the 
fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating under predetermined exchange rates 
but is zero in economies operating under flexible exchange rates.  
 
Although the existing empirical literature is quite rich in terms of the studies analyzing the 
effect of fiscal policy shocks through fiscal multiplier, the vast majority of these studies consider 
the issue from the perspective of industrialized countries rather than developing ones. However, 
in reviewing the literature we observe that in the past few years there have been an increasing 
number of studies which have especially examined the fiscal multiplier in the context of 
developing countries. The studies by Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2011), Ben-Sliamne et al. 
(2011), Çebi (2015), Mitra and Poghosyan (2015) are only some of them. Hereafter, we will 
review in detail some of these studies to shed light our paper. 
 
Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2011) examined the long-term effects of fiscal policy shocks on 
output in Portugal over the period 1977-2004 by employing a VAR approach. They concluded 
that the impacts of fiscal policy shocks are consistent with the Keynesian view. More 
specifically, both direct taxation and public investment created the Keynesian effect, whereas 
intermediate public consumption and indirect taxation had the non-Keynesian effect but with 
negligible effects. Another study on the same country by Afonso and Sousa (2011) investigated 
non-Keynesian effects were seen for the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Portugal by 
using a developed version of the SVAR technique ―a Bayesian Structural Vector 
Autoregression model. They observed that expansionary government spending shocks have, in 
general, a negative effect on real GDP, whereas government revenue shocks have a positive 
effect. In a related, but different, study by Afonso and Sousa (2012) applied the same model for 
four industrialized countries
9
. However, they found that the effects of both government 
spending and revenue shocks on GDP are positive, but the former has, in general, a smaller 
impact on GDP compared to the others.         
 
                                                          
9
 These countries are the US, the UK, Germany and Italy. 
 9 
Focusing on Chile for the period 1970-2000 and using an estimated SVAR technique, Cerda et 
al. (2006) examined whether the effects of fiscal policy shocks are Keynesian or non-Keynesian. 
They found the evidence of the non-Keynesian effects. Accordingly, a 1% fiscal expenditure 
shock led to a negative impact on GDP by nearly -0.2 % in the first year. However, the impact 
later became insignificant. On the other hand, a 1% of tax revenue shocks resulted in -0.1% 
decrease in GDP in the first year, but there were no significant impacts in the following years. 
In a VAR-based study, de Castro (2006) reached similar results for Spain, confirming that fiscal 
policy shocks create significant non-Keynesian effects on GDP.     
 
A study on Tunisia by Ben-Sliamne et al. (2011) found weak or non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
policy, like the study of Cerda et al. (2006). Their empirical findings confirmed that fiscal 
policy shocks have a weak Keynesian effect on the economic activity, reflecting the general 
characteristic of fiscal multiplier in developing countries, that is, very low Keynesian multiplies, 
exceeding “1” for neither short- nor long-run in Tunisia. A similar study on India by Yadav et 
al. (2012) concluded, among others, that the shock to tax variable has a bigger impact on GDP 
than the shock to government spending. Besides, their study indicated that in the short-run, the 
impact of expansionary fiscal shocks is the Keynesian, whereas in the long-run the results are 
mixed. 
 
A recent study by Tang et al. (2013) analyzed the effectiveness of fiscal policy in ASEAN5 
countries
10
 for the period 1990:1-2009:4 by implementing a time-varying VAR approach, an 
extended version of the B-P SVAR. Their findings showed that for government spending, the 
fiscal multiplier is highly small, much less than 1, and statistically insignificant in the all 
countries. However, they found for taxes, which are a consistent pattern of output expansion 
with fiscal contraction, the fiscal multiplier is only statistically significant for the countries of 
Indonesia and Thailand. Another very recent study on 10 Asian emerging economies
11
 by Jha et 
al. (2014) found that tax cuts have a greater countercyclical impact on output than government 
spending in the aforementioned countries.    
 
To the best of our knowledge, in reviewing the literature it seems that there have been only 
two main studies [Çebi (2010, 2015)] which highlight the same issue as we do. For instance, 
Çebi (2015) estimated the size of the government spending multiplier in Turkey for the period 
2002:Q1-2014:Q4. According to his findings, a positive shock to government spending tends 
to increase output, taxes, real interest rate and the size of the fiscal multiplier is relatively 
large at the first few quarters. On the other hand, the results show that government investment 
expenditure rather than consumption expenditures has a significant effect on output at the first 
few quarters. The main difference of our study from Çebi (2015) is that we analyze not only 
the short-term like Çebi (2015), but also long term effects of fiscal policy. Additionally, Çebi 
(2015) considers only one instrument of fiscal policy, that is, government spending. However, 
we consider the both tools of fiscal policy. Unlike the study of Çebi (2015), we analyze the 
effects of fiscal policy at the component level designed for the Turkish budget system.   
 
In reviewing the literature, one can observe that the empirical studies predicting the growth 
enhancing effect of fiscal policy shocks have focused heavily on industrialized countries, in 
particular on the US, except few recent studies on developing countries. In addition, a large 
majority of these studies have produced mixed results. In short, the subject of the impact of fiscal 
policy shocks on growth is a matter of controversy. It needs to be stressed, nonetheless, that it 
                                                          
10
 These countries consist of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
11
 These countries are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, and the 
Philippines.  
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should be seen usual. The relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth is a complex 
issue, and its complexity arises from various kinds of feedback loops between one and the other 
(Cottarelli and Jaramillo, 2012). Having considered the importance of growth for all countries, no 
matter how developed country is, and for which fiscal policy has critical implications not merely 
in short-run, but also in the long-run, we strongly believe that it would not be a time consuming to 
do more studies about the effect of fiscal policy shocks on growth, until reaching a consensus 
on it.     
5. Econometric Specification, the B-P SVAR Technique and Data  
This paper attempts to predict the growth enhancing effect of fiscal policy shocks in Turkey for 
the period 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 by using the extended version of the B-P SVAR. The main purpose 
in this paper is to investigate whether sub-components of fiscal policy instruments have growth 
enhancing effect. Accordingly, we divided taxes and government spending into their sub-
components in line with the Turkey’s budgetary system. More explicitly, we grouped taxes into 
four as value added tax, special consumption tax, personal income tax and corporate income tax, 
whereas classifying government spending into three groups as personal, current transfer, and 
interest spending. 
 
5.1. Econometric Specification 
 
In this paper, we employed the B-P SVAR and its extended version by Perotti (2005). However, 
we did not borrow their model directly. We use its augmented form with eight variables to 
capture well the growth enhancing effects of each of sub-components of fiscal policy 
instruments.  
 
Some advantages of using the B-P SVAR technique can be itemized as follow: i) Based on the 
estimation of the multivariate autoregressive vector systems, it allows us to capture the impact 
of the fiscal policy under normal times [Ben-Sliamne et al. (2011)]; ii) The B-P SVAR assist to 
identify fiscal shocks in the data together with other shocks by imposing sign restrictions for 
the identification of each shock; iii) The B-P SVAR assist to capture much better results 
compared with large-scale econometric models or reduced-form approach. Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) argue that large-scale econometric models deal largely with the postulate of an 
effect of fiscal policy on economic activity rather than its documentation. As for the reduced-
form approach, it engages the effects of summary statistic of fiscal policy.  
 
Even though, traditionally, the SVAR technique has been used to evaluate the effects of 
monetary policy shocks until last two-three decades [Arcangelis and Lamartina (2003), Lozano 
and Rodrı´guez (2011), Ben-Sliamne et al. (2011), Arestis (2011), Jha et al. (2014)], there has 
been a considerably expanding literature examining the effect of fiscal policy shocks with the 
SVAR in the last decade. However, most of these studies deal with industrialized countries such 
as the US, and some EU countries, rather than developing countries. To our best knowledge, the 
existing studies in relation to developing countries are only limited with the studies of Cerda et al. 
(2006), Ahumada (2009), Çebi (2010), Ben-Sliamne et al. (2011), Lozano and Rodrı´guez (2011), 
Yadav et al. (2012), Tang et al. (2013), and Jha et al. (2014).  
 
It would be important noting here that the B-P SVAR cannot be directly estimated because the 
parameters in the matrices are unknown and the variables have contemporaneous effects on 
each otherthat is, there is a correlation between the independent variables and    and thus OLS 
estimator will produce biased and inconsistent estimates. Since a standard VAR is concerned as 
a reduced form of the dynamic structural model, and there are no contemporaneous effects 
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between variables in the reduced form, OLS can be used to estimate the parameters in the 
reduced form equation.   
 
In general, what we have seen from the literature at the first glance is that in previous empirical 
studies aiming to identify the effect of discretionary fiscal policy shocks on macroeconomic 
variables mostly one of the following three techniques is employed:  
 
i) Structural macroeconomic techniques [See, i.e. Baxter and King (1993), Roeger 
and in't Veld (2010), Coenen et al. (2012b)],  
ii) Narrative techniques [See, i.e. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and Romer and Romer 
(2010), Ramey (2011)],  
iii) or, most commonly, VAR technique [See, i.e. Fatas and Mihov (2003), de Castro 
(2006), Giordano et al. (2007), Caldara and Kamps (2008), Kneller et al. (1999), 
Ahumada (2009), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), among many others].  
 
However, this paper considers none of these. Instead, it introduces an econometric technique 
proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and its augmented version by Perotti (2005) by 
further extending it with seven fiscal shocks variable to predict growth enhancing effect of sub-
components of fiscal policy instruments. To do so, first, we augmented the number of the B-P 
SVAR variables in its original form, and then calibrated its extended version with seven fiscal 
shock variables SVAR to quarterly data for Turkey for the period 2006:Q12015:Q1. Totally, 
the number of variables used in the model is eight: Seven fiscal variables [value added tax, 
special consumption tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, personal spending, 
current transfer spending, and interest spending] plus GDP growth rate.  
 
We start with a VAR which is an equation, an n-variable linear model in which each variable 
is explained by its own lagged value plus current and past values of the remaining n–1 
variables. The structural form of an n-variable VAR approach is (Yadav et al, 2012): 
     = 
1
k
i
        +                                                                                                                       [1]                                                                                                                             
where    is white noise. Denoting the vector of endogenous variables by    and the vector of 
reduced form residuals by    the reduced form VAR can be represented as follows: 
 
   = A(L)     +                                                                                                                     [2] 
 
Where    is a Nx1 vector of endogenous variables, A(L) is a NxN matrix lag polynomial, and 
   is a Nx1 vector of reduced form innovations which are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed with covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. In our benchmark 
specification    and    consist of the following variables:  
 
   = [                                       ]  
 
   = [  
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  ]  
The reduced form innovations of the government spending and net taxes equations as linear 
combinations of the structural fiscal shocks   
   
 and   
    to these variables and the innovations 
of the other reduced form equations of VAR, namely;    
      
      
      
      
  ,    
   
.  
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Where    is the corresponding vector of reduced form residuals with non-zero cross 
correlations. The relationship between the reduced form residuals and structural form residuals 
can be expressed as follows (Yadav et al, 2012): 
 
   =  
                                                                                                                                 [3] 
 
Where, the matrix    describes the contemporaneous relationship among the variables in 
vector   . The residuals of structural shock are uncorrelated with the variance and covariance 
matrix being diagonal. To identify the system -A Matrix, Matrix B and the diagonal elements 
of VAR covariance matrix- restrictions need to be imposed. 
 
For a two-variable VAR the structural form is as follows:                                               
 
    +     +     =     +          +           +     
    +            =     +          +           +                                                                    [4] 
 
The reduced form is: 
 
    =     +          +          +     
 
    =     +          +          +                                                                                       [5] 
 
from Equation 4 and 5 the reduced form error terms can be expressed as follows: 
 
    = (          )/(1-       ) 
 
    = (          )/(1-       )                                                                                               [6] 
 
In a two variable VAR model the reduced form of the model yields only nine parameter 
values: six coefficients estimates (                       ) and the estimates of variance 
(   ), variance (   ) and covariance (       ), whereas the structural form requires the 
estimation of 10 parameters (                             ) and the two feedback coefficients 
    and     (Yadav et al., 2012). 
 
Therefore, to estimate the structural form of the model from the reduced form requires certain 
identification restrictions. The vector moving-average representation of the model can be 
expressed as:  
 
   = m + ∑         = 0 …. infinity                                                                                            [7] 
 
The matrix (  ) can be used to generate the effects (or more populary called the impulse 
responses) of structural shocks    ‘s on the time paths of the variables   ’s. The within period 
response coefficients of (  ) the matrix are the impact multipliers. For examples     (0) is the 
instantaneous impact of a one-unit change in variable    on variable   . The element     (1) 
is the one-period response effect of    to a unit change in   . These effects can be accumulated to 
obtain the cumulative multipliers (Yadav et al., 2012). 
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5.2. The B-P SVAR Technique 
 
The identification restrictions of the B-P SVAR can be stated as a class of the model in matrix 
form as follows (Tang et al., 2013): 
 
A   = B   
 
[
     
     
       
] [
   
   
   
] = [
       
       
     
] [
   
   
   
] 
 
 
A is NxN matrix of contemporaneous relations among variables,    is the vector of the normally 
independently distributed reduced form residuals with variance-covariance. E(    
 
) =Ʃ, B is a nxn 
matrix that allows some shocks to affect more than one endogenous variable in the model; and    
is the vector of structural shocks of policy and non-policy variables, where    ~N(0,In) and 
E(    ) = 0 for t≠s.  
For a three variable fiscal VAR model ordered as (G, T, Y) the reduced form residuals are 
linear combinations of the underlying structural shocks in the three variables and can be 
expressed as (Yadav et al, 2012): 
 
 
  
 
 =      
        
  +   
 
                                                                                                       [8] 
 
  
  =      
        
 
 +   
                                                                                                         [9] 
 
  
 
 =      
        
  +   
 
                                                                                                     [10] 
 
 
Equation 8 states that the unexpected movement in the government spending variable within a 
quarter is due to unexpected movements in output (   ) or to the response to a structural 
shock to taxes (   ) or as the response to its own structural shock (  
 
). A similar interpretation 
can be applied to Equation 9. For Equation 10, the unexpected movement in output (  
 
) is a 
response to unexpected movement in spending (   ) or to unexpected movements in taxes 
(   ) or due to the other unexpected shocks   
 
. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) noted that when 
quarterly data is used, the     and     variables consist only of the automatic responses, 
component (i) as explained above, as it takes more than a quarter for the systematic 
discretionary response of policymakers and (ii) to an output shock. When a quarterly data is 
used, the second component (iii) is absent. They used institutional information on taxes and 
government spending to construct the parameters     and     the elasticity of spending and taxes 
to GDP, respectively (Yadav, et al., 2012).  
 
Using the elasticity values, the cyclically adjusted fiscal shocks can be determined as: 
 
  
  =   
  -      
 
 
  
 
 =   
 
 -      
 
 =   
 
 
    = 0 
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) took the value of     as zero because they could not find any 
automatic feedback from economic activity to government spending. Given the values of     
and    ,   
  and   
 
 can then be used as instruments to capture     and     in a regression of 
  
 
 and   
 . Now the identification of fiscal shocks requires the estimation of only two 
coefficients     and    . Using the agnostic approach they identify the model under two 
alternative assumptions: 
 
    = 0 estimate     
    = 0 estimate     
 
When the correlation between   
 
 and   
  is very low the actual ordering does not matter for 
calculating the impulse responses of output.  
 
5.3. Data  
 
In this paper, we employ quarterly time-series data for Turkey, ranging from 2006:Q1 to 
2015:Q1. The reason for initiating the series from the year 2006 is that the Turkish budgetary 
system was substantially amended in the year 2003 and the amendments were put into practice 
at the beginning of the fiscal year 2006. So, in order to avoid dissimilarity of series and to make 
data comparable, we took into consideration the year 2006 onwards as the estimation period. In 
addition, we preferred to study with quarterly data owing to the fact that it allows us to identify 
growth enhancing effects of discretionary fiscal policy shocks more precisely. The data used in 
the paper comes from two main data provider: Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of 
Development.  
 
The denotation of the variables used in this paper is, in turn, as follows: “gdp” denotes GDP 
growth rate, “vat” denotes value added tax, “sct” denotes special consumption tax, “pit” denotes 
personal income tax, “cit” denotes corporate income tax, “prs” denotes personal spending, “cts” 
denotes current transfer spending, and finally “is” denotes interest spending. All the variables 
are typed in the ln(log) form of in year “t”. Incidentally, it is noteworthy to express here that the 
series are seasonally adjusted.  
 
The visual representation of the series is depicted in Figure 1. The series encompass gdp, vat, sct, 
pit, cit, prs, and cts, respectively and cover the period 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 we studied on. As can 
be seen from the figure, all the variables have a clear trend, except one variable –that is, interest 
spending. Contrary to the other variables, it does show a fluctuating trend over the whole 
period. In short, out of interest spending, all the other variables are stationary and display a 
steadily rising trend after the mid-2009s.    
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Figure 1: Visual Presentation of the Series, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 
  
 
   
  
 
           
        Source: Prepared by the Author 
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6. Empirical Findings 
The specification and estimation method of the B-P SVAR depend on certain properties of the 
variables of the model. Before proceeding with the estimation of the model, therefore, it is 
necessary to be determined whether the variables are difference stationary or trend stationary.  
 
As shown in Table 3, the ADF unit root test and stationary results indicate that the null 
hypothesis of unit roots could not be rejected for all fiscal policy variables in level form. The 
null hypothesis, however, was rejected when the ADF test is applied to the first differences for all 
the variables. The results were reported in Table 3. As shown from the table, the ADF unit root 
test results suggest that all the variables are difference stationary. 
 
An important aspect of empirical research on the speciﬁcation of VAR models is the 
determination of the lag order of the autoregressive lag polynomial since all inferences in the 
VAR model depend on the correct model speciﬁcation. We identified the order of the VAR 
model using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criteria (SC), and 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria (HQ). They all suggest a VAR model of order one. As for the 
optimal lag length criteria, they are described in Table 4. In reference to the test of stationary of 
unit root of the ADF, it appears that the variables are stationary in first differences, of which the 
specification includes the possibility to have terms of moving average in addition to the 
autoregression terms.  
 
Figure 2 indicates the inverse unit roots which are in the interior of the circle. Thus, one can 
affirm that the selected VAR is stationary. It can be seen from Figure 2 that all the roots lie 
within the unit circle, implying that the model is stable and hence we can move to the next step 
of the analyzis.
12
  
 
The B-P SVAR is performed through impulse response and variance decomposition analyzis. 
To do so, we deal firstly with the impulse response functions and then we focus on variance 
decomposition analyzis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 All diagnostic (misspecification) tests results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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Table 3: ADF Unit Root Test and Stationary Results, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 
ADF Unit Root Tests 
 
Variables 
 
Level 
Constant 
 
Critical Value 
First Difference 
Constant and Trend 
 
Critical Value 
1 % 5 % 1 % 5 % 
gdp -0.3430 -3.7240 -2.9562 -16.8628(1)** -4.3239 -3.5806 
vat -0.7665 -3.7114 -2.9810 -7.1635(1)** -4.3098 -3.5742 
sct -0.7784 -3.6998 -2.9762 -12.4821(1)** -4.3098 -3.5742 
pit -0.7771 -3.6998 -2.9762 -9.3669(1)** -4.3098 -3.5742 
cit -2.2840 -3.6998 -2.9762 -8.9344(1)** -4.3239 -3.5806 
prs -1.4441 -3.7529 -2.9980 -7.3966(1)** -4.3239 -3.5806 
cts -1.3742 -3.7378 -2.9918 -7.2203(1)** -4.3239 -3.5806 
is -2.2801 -3.6793 -2.9677 -21.4515(1)** -4.3098 -3.5742 
 
Note: The number in parenthesis indicate the selected lag order of the ADF models. Lags are chosen based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The critical values are obtained from MacKinnon (1991) for the ADF test. 
These tests examine the null hypothesis of a unit root against the stationary alternative. Asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at 10 %. E-Views 6.1 was used for computations. 
 
Source: Computed by the Authors 
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             Table 4: Selection of Lag Length 
 
Number of 
Lags 
Log Likelihood 
Function 
LR Final Prediction 
Error (FPE) 
Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) 
Schwarz Information 
Criteria (SC) 
Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criteria 
(HQ) 
0 300.5099 NA 2.24e-18 -17.96620 -16.08027 -17.37555 
1 413.9251 125.1478 1.25e-19 -11.37414* -16.00074* -15.83846* 
  Note: Asterisk (*) donates lag order selected by the criterion. E-Views 6.1 was used for computation.  
 
  Source: Computed by the Authors 
 
Figure 2: Inverse Roots of the Characteristic Polynomial, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 
 
 
   Source: Prepared by the Authors 
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6.1. Impulse Responses  
The impulse response functions are used to examine the dynamic responses of the variables to 
various shocks with in the SVAR technique. Having identified the structural shocks, we can 
then find the impulse response of a variable to a one-time shock to any variable included in 
the model. The impulse response traces the effect on current and future values of the 
endogenous variables of one standard deviation shock to the variables. It is also illustrated for 
the sample up to 10 years to focus on the short-run dynamics. 
 
The accumulated impulse responses are presented with the course of 10 years in our sample. All 
the shocks are standardized to 1%; and thus vertical axis indicates the percentage of the 
approximate variation of the variable in responses to 1% of shock on the GDP growth rate. 
 
Figure 3 reports the results of impulse responses of each endogenous variable to the structural 
shocks for the short-run. The figure must be read in the following way: in the short-run and first 
period regarding the structuralized shock it can be observed that the effects of all variables are 
positive and significant on the GDP growth rate. And, for the last period of sample, both special 
consumption and corporate income tax have a negative effect on the GDP growth rate. In other 
words, a one standard deviation shock to special consumption tax, corporate income tax, 
personal spending resulted in an increase in the GDP growth rate after nearly the end of the 
eighth periods. On the other hand, long-run results can be viewed by the cumulative impulse 
response functions contained in Figure 4. For the first period, the impacts of personal income 
tax and current transfer spending on the GDP growth rate are negative, while that of special 
consumption tax is positive. Generally speaking, personal spending has a positive as well as 
significant effect on the GDP growth rate for the first three periods. As for current transfer 
spending and interest spending, their impacts turn out to be negative and stationary after the last 
period. All the findings are summarized in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Growth Enhancing Effect of Discretionary Fiscal Policy Shocks, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1  
Fiscal Variables 
Effect on GDP Growth Rate 
In the Short-Run In the Long-Run 
Effect duration 
Short-run 
Multiplier 
Effect duration 
Long-run 
Multiplier 
T
ax
es
 
Value Added Tax ↑ 
first 4 period: ↑ 
from 7 to 9 period: ↓ 
after 9th period: stationary 
0.16 
first 5 period: ↑ 
after 5th period : ↓ 
-0.04 
Special Consumption Tax ↑ after 8th : ↑ 0.50 
 
from 4 to 7: ↓ 
after 8th : ↑ 
-0.01 
Personal Income Tax ↑ after 7th : stationary -0.09 
from 6 to 9th : ↑ 
after 9th : ↓ 
0.00 
Corporate Income Tax ↑ after 8th : ↑ 0.65 
from  4 to 9th : ↓ 
after 9th : ↑ 
0.04 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
S
p
en
d
in
g
 Personal Spending ↑ after 8
th : ↑ 1.17 
 
from 4 to 9: ↓ 
after 9th : ↑ 
-0.03 
Current Transfer Spending ↑ after 8th : ↑ 2.65 
after 8th : stationary 
after 9th : ↓ 
-0.03 
Interest Spending ↑ stationary 0.78 stationary -0.10 
Source: Prepared by the Authors 
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         Figure 3: Short-Run Accumulated Impulse-Response Analyzis, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 
 
Note: The lines represent a gross domestic product shock (shock 1), value  added tax shock (shock 2), special consumption tax shock (shock 3), personal income tax shock (shock 4), corporate income 
tax shock  (shock 5), personal spending shock (shock 6), current transfer spending shock (shock 7), and interest spending shock (shock 8), respectively. 
Source: Prepared by the Authors  
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        Figure 4: Long-Run Accumulated Impulse-Response Analyzis, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 
Note: The lines represent a gross domestic product shock (shock 1), value  added tax shock (shock 2), special consumption tax shock (shock 3), personal income tax shock (shock 4), corporate income 
tax shock  (shock 5), personal spending shock (shock 6), current transfer spending shock (shock 7), interest spending shock (shock 8), respectively. 
Source: Prepared by the Authors 
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6.2. Variance Decomposition 
 
To indicate the relative importance of the shocks, it should be looked at variance 
decomposition analyzis. For this purpose, we estimate percentage of forecast variance to 
determine amount of shocks of variables. 
 
Table 6 and 7 present the results obtained from the short- and long-run variance decomposition 
analyzis, respectively. As shown in Table 6, the GDP growth rate is mostly influenced by its 
own shocks during the first period of the sample. In the short-run, 9% of variation is accounted 
for by current transfer spending for the first period of the sample horizon. It is followed 
by the value added tax shock, accounting for 6.73% of variation on the GDP growth rate. 
For the last period, however, the results have changed dramatically. At the end of the 
sample, the most effective shocks on the GDP growth rate arise from corporate income tax 
shocks which account for 30.37 and personal spending shock which accounts for 7.21 % of 
variance, and then it is followed by special consumption tax shock with a 5.5% of variance.  
 
Table 7 provides evidence on the relative importance of each of the long-run shocks. As shown 
from the table, the GDP growth rate is mostly explained by value- added tax shocks. At the 
beginning of the sample, value  added tax shock (67.52%) is the most effective tax on the GDP 
growth rate in the long-run for the last period and corporate income tax becomes second 
(6.66%) after its own shocks. However, a conspicuous finding arising from the variance 
decomposition analyzis is that special consumption tax shocks as well as interest spending 
shocks have nearly no influence on the GDP growth rate at the beginning of the period for the 
long-run B-P SVAR.  
 
The variance decomposition analyzis in the last period revealed that the most effective tax 
shock comes from value added tax by 22.23%. And then it is followed by special consumption 
tax (8.49%) for the last period of the sample. Overall, our empirical findings showed that in the 
short-run, the GDP growth rate is, mostly reacted to corporate income tax, as a sort of tax,  
and personal spending, as a sort of spending, for the last period of the short-run B-P SVAR. In 
the long-run, however, it is affected first by value added tax shocks after its own shocks, and 
then by special consumption tax shocks for the last period of the sample. 
 
Table 6: Short-Run Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of GDP, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 
 
 
 
Period 
 
 
 
S.E 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Shock 
(Shock 1) 
Value  
Added 
 Tax  
Shock 
(Shock 2) 
 
Special 
Consumption 
Tax  
Shock 
(Shock 3) 
 
Personal 
Income  
Tax 
 Shock 
(Shock 4) 
 
Corporate 
Income 
 Tax 
 Shock 
(Shock 5) 
Personal 
Spending 
Shock 
(Shock 6) 
 
Current 
Transfer 
Spending 
Shock 
(Shock 7) 
Interest 
Spending 
Shock 
(Shock 8) 
 
1 0.021129 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 0.039346 72.04238 6.739851 6.156049 3.549508 0.062800 2.419608 9.003128 0.026677 
3 0.049847 71.38059 7.439286 5.265282 2.276733 0.520387 6.416687 6.683771 0.017266 
4 0.057343 65.58721 5.649428 4.130456 1.783202 11.09421 6.478746 5.221206 0.055544 
5 0.065751 52.52977 4.628814 4.617641 1.643294 25.92715 6.098335 4.493745 0.061243 
6 0.071902 44.64704 3.982752 6.207909 1.813417 32.21899 6.802888 4.275289 0.051713 
7 0.075632 44.21762 3.707996 5.806188 1.666120 32.70788 6.896177 4.950822 0.047201 
8 0.078348 46.36605 4.008081 5.462730 1.552609 30.48044 6.619878 5.466229 0.043987 
9 0.082828 47.85223 3.727007 5.438287 1.389536 29.50755 7.151953 4.892665 0.040772 
10 0.087417 47.34817 3.430182 5.506074 1.271994 30.37627 7.210311 4.816073 0.040926 
Source: Estimated by the Authors 
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Table 7: Long-Run Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of GDP, 2006:Q1-2015:Q1 
 
 
 
Period 
 
 
 
S.E 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Shock 
(Shock 1) 
Value  
Added 
 Tax  
Shock 
(Shock 2) 
 
Special 
Consumption 
Tax  
Shock 
(Shock 3) 
 
Personal 
Income  
Tax 
 Shock 
(Shock 4) 
 
Corporate 
Income 
 Tax 
 Shock 
(Shock 5) 
Personal 
Spending 
Shock 
(Shock 6) 
 
Current 
Transfer 
Spending 
Shock 
(Shock 7) 
Interest 
Spending 
Shock 
(Shock 8) 
 
1 0.021129 23.67381 67.52518 0.076530 0.459923 6.668294 0.487138 0.875165 0.233961 
2 0.039346 27.45650 38.15713 8.200036 3.546520 6.056532 13.47817 2.783032 0.322076 
3 0.049847 37.77819 32.24202 7.802892 4.807946 6.292072 8.768089 2.079721 0.229066 
4 0.057343 48.57936 26.85314 6.747916 4.077022 4.764508 6.804824 1.992851 0.180375 
5 0.065751 52.95141 20.42658 9.053034 4.196967 4.708795 6.053962 2.417409 0.191851 
6 0.071902 49.84825 20.08405 10.80574 3.549989 6.557875 6.969752 2.023458 0.160896 
7 0.075632 45.38092 22.31705 10.22314 4.584327 7.995037 7.472319 1.880835 0.146375 
8 0.078348 44.58110 23.08540 9.744252 5.251732 7.878839 7.558453 1.759744 0.140474 
9 0.082828 47.62851 22.95141 8.866022 4.859504 7.170083 6.806121 1.592564 0.125792 
10 0.087417 49.62526 22.23730 8.495153 4.685275 6.843214 6.456516 1.539548 0.117731 
Source: Estimated by the Authors 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we predicted empirically the growth enhancing effect of discretionary fiscal policy 
shocks in both short- and long-run at component level in Turkey by applying the B-P SVAR 
technique to Turkish data, spanning from 2006:Q1 to 2015:Q1. To do so, we used the augmented 
version of the technique with eight variables, encompassing seven fiscal shock variables [four 
tax variables: value-added tax, special consumption tax, personal income tax and corporate 
income tax and three spending variables: personal spending, current transfer spending and 
interest spending], along with the GDP growth rate.   
 
According to our findings, the growth enhancing effects of discretionary fiscal policy shocks 
change depending on its sub-components. More specifically, the growth enhancing effects of 
government spending shocks are relatively much larger than that of tax shocks. In the short-
run, fiscal policy multiplier related to taxes appears to be lower than 1 or negative. Moreover, 
in the long-run, they become close to zero and/or become negative. Based on these findings, it 
can be argued that shocks to taxes create a very weak Keynesian effect and non-Keynesian 
effect in case of Turkey. Generally speaking, shocks to government spending have however, 
much stronger effect on growth in the short-run. For instance, the fiscal multiplier coefficient 
of personal spending is 1.17, whereas it becomes much stronger for current transfer spending, 
with a coefficient of 2.65. This indicates that government spending has the Keynesian effect 
in the short-run. However, in the long-run it appears that this effect turns to a very weak 
Keynesian and non-Keynesian. 
 
In sum, based on all the findings above, it may be argued that in the long-run fiscal policy is an 
ineffective macroeconomic policy tool in stimulating growth. However, the only government 
spending is an effective fiscal policy tool which can spur growth in the short-run, but not in 
the long-run. The findings of the paper suggest that i) growth enhancing effect of discretionary 
fiscal policy reveals mixed results, depending on types of fiscal policy instruments ―taxes 
and spending― and their components and time period; ii) shocks to taxes have either a weak 
Keynesian or non-Keynesian effect whatever the time period is; iii) shocks to government 
spending create the Keynesian effect, but in the long-run they become the non-Keynesian.    
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All these results may be attributed to numerous factors, such as country and government size, 
openness to trade, exchange rate regimes, interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, 
access to liquidity, crowding-out/-in effect of private sector, and so on. Further empirical 
research is needed in all these areas, examining the relationship between each of these factors 
and the growth enhancing effects of discretionary fiscal policy which are the subject of other 
studies.  
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